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ZEN NOTIONS OF LANDSCAPE AND SELF 
REFLECTED IN TIM WINTON'S CLOUDSTREET 
George Watt 
Nine-year-old Samson "Fish" Lamb drowns when on a family fishing 
expedition. Seemingly through her concrete will, his mother brings him 
back to life; but what seems miraculous turns out otherwise, for Fish is alive 
but abnormal. The Lambs' quid pro quo kind of Christianity cannot 
withstand the assault. As newly converted atheists they head for Perth, 
where they rent half of the Pickles' decaying mansion, where for the next 
twenty years they swim in their own sea of incompletion. And for the next 
twenty years whenever he is near water, Fish must be tied to a tree or the 
seat of a boat to stop him plunging himself into eternity. Inevitably at the 
end of the novel he escapes, Winton describing his death in this manner: 
The water. 
And the mirror it makes. 
Ah, the water, the water, the water. 
Fish leans out and the water is beautiful. All that country below, the soft winy 
country with its shifts of colour, its dark, marvellous call... 
... Down he slopes into the long spiral. drinking, drinking his way into the tumble past 
the dim panic of muscle and nerve into a queer bursting fullness. And a hesitation, a 
pause for a few moments. I'm a man for that long. I feel my manhood, I recognise myseU 
whole and human, know my story for just that long, long enough to see how we've come, 
how we've all battled in the same corridor that time makes for us, and I'm Fish Lamb 
for those seconds it takes to die, as long as it takes to drink the river, as long as it took to 
tell you all this, and then my walls are tipping and I burst into the moon. sun and stars 
of who I really am. Being Fish tamb. Perfectly. Always. Everyplace. Me.1 
How to read this death? It is neither the pathetic death of a half-wit, nor a 
tragic or ironic end; it bears no horror of suicide for the tone is exultant, 
perhaps even Romantic. 
And in it there is something perplexing and intriguing about 
Winton's view of Fish's Self as something fluid and changing. At first he is 
the half wit in the mirror surface of the sea. Then the whole man who 
speaks briefly. And after that a third Self which "bursts into the moon, sun 
and stars of who I really am" - an Everyplace Me that has much in common 
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with the elusive Buddhist notion of nirvana as Fish describes its coming on. 
Winton uses the complex moment of Fish's death to reveal Self as process 
rather than as a fixed entity, at the same time blurring boundaries between 
person and place, subject and object, life and death - in fact the very dualities 
which we use to define our selves and our place in the world. In Fish Lamb's 
final self ("who I really am") we discover what might be called a state of 
undifferentiation, where One is All and All is One. 
Zen philosophy always begins with place - either through a 
disarmingly simple description of something in the landscape ("mountains 
are mountains; waters are waters"2) or through a seemingly nonsensical 
statement about it ("all the rivers run backwards"3). Cryptic or 
straightforward, these statements actually contain the essences of traditional 
Buddhist thinking, and as such they are the springboards from which all 
Zen argument will proceed. Ch'ing-yuan Wei-hsin (Zen Master from the 
T'ang Dynasty) even presents his life history through place: 
Thirty years ago, before I began the study of Zen, I said, 'Mountains are mountains, 
waters are wateJ:S.' 
After I got an insight into the truth of Zen through the instruction of a good master, I 
said, 'Mountains are not mountains, waters arl! not waters.' 
Out now, having obtained the abode of final rest [that is Awakening], I say, 'Mountains 
are really mountains, waters are really waters'.4 
At the beginning of this Zen journey we seemingly live in a world governed 
by dualities which begin with me looking at the mountain, subject and 
object. But we are not really involved in a simple look at scenery, for Wei-
hsin is obliquely inviting us into the cornerstone of all Buddhist teaching, 
the four Noble Truths. One - all existence includes suffering; two - the 
cause of suffering can be understood; three - suffering can be overcome. (In 
this lies the primary aim of Buddhism.) Suffering can be relieved because 
much of its primal cause is to be found within the psyche, not without. The 
cause of much human suffering is the trenchant desire of the ego-self for 
possessions, for gratification, but above all for permanence or glorification. 
Bishop Stephen Neill describes the radically startling Buddhist solution to 
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this kind of egocentric suffering: "abolish the entity, and therewith we shall 
abolish the sufferer; abolish the ego, which believes that it suffers, and there 
will no longer be anything that can suffer ... "5 This seems to call for nothing 
less than the banishment of the notion of subject and object. So Wei-hsin's 
first stage in establishing a subject-object duality initially seems to run 
contrary to the central intention of the Buddhist way. 
Which takes us to his second-stage discovery that "mountains are not 
mountains" . Remove the subject and the object disappears, even something 
as big as a mountain - a different kind of faith for removing mountains. 
What Wei-hsin discovers is quite similar in spirit to Fish's momentary 
perception: I have trouble distinguishing between myself and other things 
in the universe. They are in the Buddhist realm of Mu, a Japanese word that 
has been unwisely translated into "Nothingness". Even allowing for 
difficulties in translation, the rational Western mind, disciplined in notions 
of duality, has great trouble understanding Wei-hsin's second stage, where 
Everything meets in Nothingness - where Fish finds who he really is. Our 
Hebraic and Greek inheritances are ardently dualistic, the former separating 
spirit and flesh, God and creature, etc., and the latter separating the world of 
intellect from the world of the senses. Furthermore, reason has not only 
been accepted by many as our most valued function, it has often been 
posited as the very centre of our being. So how can there be no self when 
common sense and corporeal reality insist otherwise: I see that mountain, 
therefore I am. 
After a lecture by Kyoto School philosopher Masao Abe, a puzzled 
Father de Weirdt speaks for the Western mind: 
.. . what .. . puzzles me is the concept of Nothingness. As you said in your lecture, "The 
realisation of one's Nothingness is the realisation of one's true Self", and "I arn nothing 
whatsoever." lf thM is true, both in the ontological and in the actual sphere of I ife, 
what is the use of talking? What are we doing in this life il we are absolutely 
nothing?' 
Wei-hsin's second stage of undifferentiation when "mountains are not 
mountains" is founded on the Buddhist view of the interconnectedness of 
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all things. I have said the two aims of Buddhism are to relieve suffering, and 
to remove the power of the ego. The third is to connect us to a greater reality 
that exists beyond language, beyond definition, beyond doctrine, beyond 
argument, even or especially beyond religion - a place of absolute fullness 
where we can name no-thing. Mu is better translated as a place where no 
single thing can be named, since it is beyond the capacity of the intellect to 
do so. We ·could be working here with Tillich's theonomous reasoning- I 
need to do more reading on that - or we could be close to Wittgenstein's 
"mystery", which has been defined as the "immediate experience of 
unsayable qualities illuminating the face of the world."7 In Zen terminology, 
undifferentiation is something to do with the discovery in meditation that 
the "isness" of the mountain and the "isness" of the self are deeply and 
mysteriously and for that thoughtless moment interconnected. Of course 
this kind of intuition cannot define, for in the very act of definition is the 
danger of creating the inert, of reducing instead of enriching. The Eastern 
notion that defining takes us away from the truth has had some support in 
the West since Heraclitus. According to Henri Bergson, the intelJect which is 
"skillful in dealing with the inert is awkward the moment it touches the 
living; the intellect is characterised by a natural inability to comprehend 
Iife." 8 In Buddhism we come close to these philosophers mentioned above 
who refuse to be part of Whitehead's footnote to Plato. They argue that 
philosophy must try to deal with the unthought and the unthinkable, the 
ever changing and the dynamic. You cannot, Heraclitus and Wei-sing and 
others insist, step into the same river twice, even though every sense and 
intellect will convince you that you are. Nor indeed does the same self do 
the stepping. 
In the images of Fish's death we can actually see the Self as process, 
and undifferentiation in process. Fish is himself but not himself; the 
universe is the universe but he is a part of it. Cloudstreet is a novel that 
allows for two interconnected yet initially separate spheres of existence, 
separate because the average person tied to the workaday world cannot sense 
the dynamism and complexities of the other realm. Cloudstreet describes the 
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struggles and sufferings of the Lambs and the Pickles, what happens to them, 
and their daily problems. This is plot, or linear history if you will. But 
behind and beyond and around this world, Winton reveals a sphere which 
looks at the dynamics of place and time in a more complex and intertwined 
manner. 
The Aboriginal presence in the novel helps to establish this non-
rational sphere of existence which dynamically refuses to separate history 
and now, me and you. At its simplest level this suggests that the complete 
40,000 year-old Aboriginal world is part of every Australian, whether we live 
with Aboriginals in the same street or have never met one at all. 
Mountains are easy to see, but the complex forces that make the past a 
woven part of our present remain unseen to the normal, rational eye in the 
novel. As the novel approaches its climax, the interconnection of the two 
spheres becomes more obvious. Sam Pickles is thinking about selling the 
house, but he meets a strange black man who talks him out of it. Sam 
describes him as not quite belonging to the normal world for his "shadow 
comes out on four sides of him like a footy player under lights at training." 
Sam is told not to "break a place" because "too many places are busted" (406). 
He doesn't in the end. 
In another extract Quick Lamb, Fish's brother, meets this same 
Aborigine (or perhaps another one) when he is vaguely pondering the 
meaning of life. He asks the stranger 
Haven' t you got a home to go to? 
Not U1is side. 
Quick looked across Ule river. Through Ule steam he Ulought he saw moving figures, 
dark outlines on Ule far bank. 
Are you real? 
The black feUow laughed. Are you? (386) 
Quick also unwittingly attests to the interconnectedness of all things when 
he leaves his lucrative job culling kangaroos. One night when peering 
through the sight on his rifle he sees himself running away, desperately 
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trying to escape with the kangaroos. In the imagination, subject-object 
undifferentiation is not exactly unheard of. 
But it is Fish who has the most comprehensive vision of 
interconnectedness. He constantly hears the house whispering, and has no 
trouble seeing two spirits in the walls. The first is an aboriginal girl who 
eighty years before was driven to suicide by a perverse do-gooder who used 
the house as a training institution for the domestication of the blacks. The 
philanthropist dies soon after the girl, and does so while she is playing the 
piano, her face falling and hitting middle C. Fish can still hear the note 
reverberating. He inhabits a private world where the living and the dead 
meet; according to his father he is part alive and part dead himself. Nor can 
he separate the human and the animal world, loving his pet Pentecostal pig 
who speaks in tongues that only he can understand. Fish is so tenuously 
connected to the matter-ofcfact world that he has to be tied to it physically to 
keep him there. "You know the rules," Quick reminds Fish when they are 
out fishing. "I have to have string" (305). 
I have been talking about that middle phase of undifferentiation in 
Wei-hsin's tripartite passage as it appears all but obliquely in Cloudstreet. 
But there is also a third phase when he sees "mountains as really 
mountains". Does he go back to square one? Yes and no. He is actually 
restating in a simple form the great Nagarjuna's notion of the Middle Way. 
We have gone from differentiation to undifferentiation, two poles of all self 
and no self. Too much loyalty to either pole means we get lost. Nagarjuna 
"severely criticises a oneness of everything without discrimination as a false 
equality or a false sameness."9 Following the Middle Way allows for the here 
and the now and the body I have to live with, and for the vast unspeakable 
current that underlies all life and exists beyond definition. But more than 
that, the Middle Way makes it easy to suspend yourself calmly on top of the 
tension arc created by the two poles. Winton's description of Fish's process 
death or process becoming or whatever we might call it, is finally posited in 
a middle way, and all three of Wei-hsin's stages are included by Winton: 
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Fish in the sea as mirror object and as whole man; undifferentiated Fish as 
moon and stars; then finally Fish in the middle of both Everyplace and Me. 
In this paper I am not trying to be a missionary for Buddhism. 
Cloudstreet is not a Buddhist novel. What I am suggesting is this: that the 
novel earnestly explores what it really means to be in this world of ours. 
Winton cannot capture his sense of being in one religious tradition, 
unconsciously borrowing from several and agreeing with Quick Lamb, at 
least in part, when he says that "We all tum into the same thing, don't we? 
Memories, shadows, worries, dreams. We all join up somewhere in the 
end" (402). Not a happy thought for fundamentalists of any creed. 
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